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[TITLE SLIDE]  I first encountered Jacques Derrida’s question “De l’animal peut-on parler?” fifteen years ago, before his now-ubiquitous essay “The animal that therefore I am” had been translated into English.  I used the question as the epigraph for something I was writing at that time, and it’s been rumbling around in my head ever since, as a reminder of the difficulty of speaking about animals, and of the fact that nothing can be taken for granted in our attempts to do so.  But my own present title, “How do we speak about art about animals?,” has rather different concerns.  I want to pay particular attention to the voice of the artist and, we might say, to the voice of the artwork.  My interest in this question has become stronger recently, and I should explain why.
Having been writing about the representation of animals in art and in popular culture for more than 25 years, in 2009 I resumed my own long-lapsed art practice, and found myself beginning to shape a body of photographic work that finds parallels in my writing, [BAKER 1] but has also obliged me to think with new eyes about the relation of writing and image-making in the field of animal studies.  Far from leading to a new clarity in my thinking, this double-edged perspective has led me into a kind of productive bewilderment, and this talk is an attempt to reflect on these difficulties, these contradictory impulses.
	The examples I plan to discuss all involve artists thinking about animals, though not all those artists are animal advocates, and in a couple of cases they may even appear to be using animal symbolism in a wholly anthropocentric manner.  But they each subtly open something up, [GUATTARI quote] and exemplify Felix Guattari’s assertion that “The work of art, for those who use it, is an activity of unframing, of rupturing sense.”
[ITALIA 1]  My first example of that unframing is found in the work of the young Italian performance artist Elena Italia, who’s currently based in England.  In 2011 she contributed a three-day performance to the group exhibition Salthouse 11, held in the medieval church of St Nicholas in Salthouse, a small village on the north Norfolk coast, where the church stands on a ridge [ITALIA 2] overlooking the wide salt marshes between the village and the sea.  Untitled was a durational performance piece developed in response to the fading memory of the 1953 floods that devastated parts of the north Norfolk coast.  Three hundred and seven human lives were lost in those floods, as were those of an unrecorded number of cattle that grazed on the marshes just inland from the coast.
	[ITALIA 3]  Over a three-day period, performing for seven hours a day, the artist walked barefoot down from the church and across the salt marshes to the shingle beach, half a mile or more from the church, to fill two large pails with sea water.  [ITALIA 4]  These were carried back to the church, where, at the far end of the nave, they were used to fill a large enameled basin on the floor.  [ITALIA 5]  One by one, three hundred and seven cows’ stomachs were carefully washed and scrubbed with the salt water, before being individually hung to dry on wooden clothes horses (as we call them in English) that the artist had set up alongside the medieval choir stalls.  [ITALIA 6]  The performance was slow, contemplative, dignified, and conducted in complete silence.  Quiet and rather ambiguous sounds of the wash of the waves were played over speakers, along with the sounds of the basin in which the stomachs were being washed.
	Although one cow’s stomach represented each human life lost in 1953, they also directly alluded to and commemorated the lost lives of the cattle that drowned.  Sourced from a local butcher, and drying in the chancel of the church that had been used as a shelter by the villagers at the time of the floods, these animal materials served a site-specific but resonantly ambiguous and contradictory symbolic role.  [ITALIA 7]  As one of the elderly residents of the area said to Italia in the course of her research on the floods, prior to the performance: “The locals who remember all know that it will happen again, but the trouble is we are getting fewer and fewer.”  The gravity, seriousness and subtlety of the resulting performance was, of course, entirely lost on the local press.  [ITALIA 8]
The journalist’s difficulty in believing that anything involving animal materials could be serious, or respectful, or could even be art, is indicative of a wider mistrust of contemporary art that can also be found within the academic field of animal studies.  And when it does occur in animal studies, it typically combines mistrust and inattentiveness.  This is writing that doesn’t feel the need carefully to look or to describe, and instead just points in the general direction of a troublesome example.  It’s evident, for example, in some of the writing about contemporary art that incorporates actual animals, living or dead.  This is usually a sincere and ethically-engaged but aesthetically flat writing that can sometimes amount to little more than a checklist of the ethical shortcomings of all-too-familiar examples – invariably including the dog allegedly left to starve to death as part of a gallery installation, and often accompanied by the assertion that such work cannot be “art,” in inverted commas.
In making this observation, my point is not to defend or to condone manifestly irresponsible artworks.  It is that this standardization of examples, which are discussed briefly but repeatedly, serves to dull and to level out both their differences and their heartlessness, their cruelty, their disengagement.  Thick, detailed, attentive description of any one of them – or at least, of any verifiable one of them – could have rendered that vivid, without the writer ever needing to voice their own condemnation of the work.
The tension between art and language persists, of course, but can take unexpected turns.  [BRITTON CLOUSE 1]  Mary Britton Clouse, one of the artists in the Ecce Animalia exhibition that we’ll have an opportunity to see later this afternoon, is also the founder of a small campaigning group in the United States called the Justice for Animals Arts Guild.  Formed in 2000, the specific aim of the group was to campaign against the use of living animals in contemporary art, opposing not only art that involves the killing or cruel treatment of animals, but regarding even the seemingly benign use of living animals in the making of an artwork as unnecessary and unwarranted.
But a development in Britton Clouse’s own art practice in the mid-2000s made matters more complicated.  She’d been taking many photographs of chickens rescued from abusive situations in order to put the images on her website in order to find adoptive homes for the birds.  The images were quite separate from her art practice.  They were made very simply, by her standing in her back yard holding a bird in one hand and her camera in the other.  But by chance, and by mistake, she failed in one instance to keep her own face out of the photograph, and found herself confronted by the overlapping faces of chicken and artist.  Even then, it was only slowly that she came to realize that the first accidental image – and others like it that were made following her hunch that something interesting might be going on there – might come to find a place as a new element in her art practice.  [BRITTON CLOUSE 2]  The thing that particularly excited her about the photographs was that they seemed to address the “unjustified apprehension” that many people have “about being physically close to a bird.”  She said: “They’re such an alien species to people, and there’s that ‘oh, they’re dirty and they’re scary and they’ll peck your eyes out’ – and having that physical proximity to my face is an intimacy that I want.  There’s a level of trust there as well.”
In one respect the series sits awkwardly alongside the Justice for Animals Arts Guild’s view that even the benign use of living animals in the making of an artwork is unwarranted, and should be avoided.  The series is, after all, wholly dependent on the photographic presence of a chicken alongside the artist, and being handled by the artist. And the power of that juxtaposition is wholly dependent on the recognition that these are unfaked photographs, rupturing the sense of human-animal distinctions and hierarchies in a manner that a painting couldn’t begin to achieve.  But artworks are objects, material things, with their own internal necessity and integrity, their own resonances, and their own work to do.  They are not, and should not be, illustrations of moral philosophy.
	[BELL 1]  With my next example, I’m going to suggest that clinging too closely to their own intended meanings and outcomes poses a particular problem for artists.  Of the artists I interviewed for my recent book, Artist|Animal, Catherine Bell was far from typical, because her filmed hour-long performance Felt is the Past Tense of Feel used animals, but she had no interest in them as such.  Their purpose was anthropocentric symbolism.  She wanted to make a piece of work about her father’s recent painful death from cancer, and about her own mourning of that death, and the forty dead squid she’d commissioned to be caught for the purpose were simply part of the materials needed for this performance commemorating one particular human death.  But it seemed to me that there was something about this extraordinary imagery that could not so easily be contained by its stated purpose, and that was what I was interested to pursue.
Filmed on the darkened stage of a disused theatre in Melbourne, the artist is seen with bleached hair, and is wearing a man’s suit – her dead father’s suit – that has been completely and meticulously covered in pale pink felt.  The camera records the artist’s actions as she lifts each of the squid, tilts her head back, and squeezes its black ink into her mouth, then leans forwards and down in order to spit the ink out, initially over her bare feet, and then, little by little, over the suit.
As Bell freely admitted, “There’s a lot of direction from me in all of the work. I like to have full control.”  She was also utterly convinced that there was little or no space for viewers to read the performance differently.  She cited the example of an elderly viewer of the installation when it was first exhibited, saying: “He looked at it for about five minutes, and he said ‘my wife has just died of cancer, and when I look at that, that’s what I think of’. So I thought, he gets it, he got the message, so I know people recognize it.”
She was an articulate speaker about her work, but in the case of this piece, her inclination was to offer explanations and interpretations, and it was with some difficulty that I nudged her towards simply describing her experience of working with the squid on that Melbourne theatre stage.  [BELL 2]  This led to responses that had a very different character: “I never rehearsed the performance,” she said.  “And I didn’t plan that after two or three of the sucking of the squid that it was so salty that my mouth couldn’t actually purse and suck any more, which is why it gets quite violent at the end … My mouth was all blistered inside, my lips were all cracked, it was so painful, and I hadn’t planned that.”
She went on to describe in some detail how the process of the performance was characterized by an awareness of the evolving interaction of her emotions, her bodily reactions, her materials and her sense of responsibility to the film’s eventual viewers.   As she explained: 
The first time I did it I sucked too much in and it actually took my breath away because it went right down my throat, and I thought, I’m going to vomit, and it’s going to ruin the performance. So, I was very aware of my own body and how it was reacting to what was going on. A lot of the time I had to try and put that aside, I had to put the hurt, the ego aside, I guess, and realize that if I think about any of that it’s going to come across in my face, it’s going to distract what the viewer sees. I felt I had to be totally deadpan, so that it wasn’t about me, and me performing something, it was about just a process, it’s like I couldn’t be in my body, because I thought I’d be thinking about my father and all of that, but it was totally me and the material, me and the animal, and me and the process of doing that, and being totally caught up in that exchange.
[BELL 3]  What is it that happened in the performance, and in particular in that moment of separation that was marked by the artist’s realization that “I had to put the hurt aside, the ego aside,” because otherwise “it’s going to come across in my face,” and that this would “distract what the viewer sees”?  One way of thinking about this might be to see it as a shift from a humanist or anthropocentric register to something more open, more uncertain.  It could even be said, perhaps, that Felt is the Past Tense of Feel is a posthumanist work made by an artist in a humanist frame of mind – until, that is, she was swept up in the process of the performance itself.  As Bell herself acknowledges, “by the end there was a remarkable shift in my understanding of the animal.”
	[SINGER 1]  I now come to Angela Singer, another artist whose work is included in the Ecce Animalia exhibition.  Some of her reworkings of trophy heads or of complete taxidermic animal bodies over the past decade or so she describes as her “memorial works”: “The animal, having no grave site, no bodily burial, becomes its own memorial,” she writes.  The artist turns the already-dead animal (or animal remains, to be more precise) into an object, a different kind of object, and the object then “works,” as it were, on the animal’s behalf.  Animal advocates unsympathetic to contemporary art sometimes criticize artists for “objectifying” animals – Singer herself reports being accused of turning “gallery walls into open graves” – but her work offers one of the clearest examples of the unsettling power of the animal-as-object.
	And here her work taps into an important point about the character of contemporary art regardless of whether it has anything whatsoever to do with animals.  It was neatly expressed two years ago by the artist Steve McQueen, when he said in an interview:  [McQUEEN quote]  “Art can’t fix anything.  It can just observe and portray.  What’s important is that it becomes an object, a thing you can see and talk about and refer to. … It’s someone’s view of an incident, an advanced starting point.”  Let’s look in more detail at the extent to which this might apply to Singer’s practice.
In relation to what she calls the “flawed dead animal” of her recycled and “botched taxidermy,” she has said: “it draws me closer because it’s not beautiful, not sentimental, not what animal art is meant to be.”  She insists that art of this kind “should be done strongly, and for me that means using animal bodies,” because, she says, “the animal body speaks to the viewer’s human body.  Lines of body communication are opened up.  In our gut we know human and animal are interdependent.”
[SINGER 2]  How to make works that address that conviction is an ongoing challenge.  Among her fairly recent works, Spartle is particularly compelling because its look – somehow arrived at in the coming-together of the recycled taxidermy hawk, modelling clay and wax of which it is comprised – is utterly baffling.  There is something terrible in this object’s flailing, failing-to-be-an-animal.  And its power as an object is in that inserting of an instability into human expectations of the natural world.  This is the artwork as object, not idea, and it has to work as an object.  Whether and how it does so will shape what it can convey or communicate.  These things are determined by the form of the artwork, and in many cases by its resistance to easy interpretation.
	Singer is acutely aware of what she calls “the problems in handling an animal’s body, handling it with respect but still being able to make the artwork I want to make.  Just because there’s so much pulling apart and destroying in order to create.”  Her initial discomfort with working with taxidermy in this manner was something she had to overcome “because I wanted to use that as the medium to express what I wanted to say about animals and how we treat them.”  She openly acknowledges that “it’s bizarre that I’m handling these animals so roughly” in order to comment through her work “on how we treat animals so badly.”
	In the case of the badly damaged taxidermic hawk used in Spartle, what comes through clearly enough in Singer’s comments is the difficult but necessary strategy of taking liberties with animal form while simultaneously maintaining some sense of integrity in the process.  Something of the hawk and its history persists in the piece, however obscurely.  Rachel Poliquin has a great phrase for this stubborn presence: she calls it “the truthiness of the animal.”  As she argues: “The material truth of animal form obscures or neutralizes any propaganda motivating the image.”  Poliquin is thinking primarily of museum taxidermy rather than of artists’ use of the medium, but the statement could just as easily be applied to Singer’s work.  And in a recent interview Singer has reflected on a shift in her own perceptions of her practice:
When I first started out working with old taxidermy I thought that perhaps I was trying to get through an animal rights message with the work, but I’ve actually changed my mind over time, in that instead of trying to deliver an overt message, what I want the viewer to do is to think about the work and come to what they think about what I’m trying to say themselves.
The fact that Singer’s work is informed by her unwavering commitment to animal rights does not mean that there is a strident “message” to her work.  She knows that each piece has to work as an object before it can do anything else, and that insisting on any particular interpretation of the work would achieve nothing.
	I’d like to give two more examples of this.  [WATT 1]  A few years ago Yvette Watt, an Australian artist who shares Britton Clouse’s and Singer’s commitment to the cause of animal rights, was making work such as this, superimposing the eyes of different species on to photographs of her own face.  She explained the imagery as “an attempt to identify on a personal level with those animals whose lives have for the most part been reduced to that of commodities ad who are rarely thought of as sentient individuals with similar physical, behavioural and emotional needs to ourselves.”
	[WATT 2]  Her more recent Animal Factories series, however, is less contrived and is powerfully understated.  Like the buildings they depict, the photographs give little away.  Watt says of them:
The photographs … capture images of the farms from publicly accessible vantage points.  [WATT 3]  … a key aim in the project is to draw attention to these sites, many of which are visible from the road, but remain invisible to the majority of people passing by as they are unaware of what it is they are looking at.
[WATT 4]  They have the quality of documentary images snatched as evidence.  The style fits the subject, and the balance between knowing and not-knowing is finely judged.  They don’t try too hard.  Neither hectoring nor sentimental, each photograph is an object rather than an argument.
	I’ve learned a lot from thinking about examples such as these in recent months, and I want to reflect briefly on the impact it’s had on how I think about my own work.  [BAKER 2]  I’m currently working on a series called Scapeland, and I feel honoured that four pieces from that series have been considered interesting enough to be included in the Ecce Animalia exhibition.
Almost all of the work I’ve been making over the past four years has engaged with my encounters with roadkill in the largely rural county of Norfolk, in the east of England, where I now live. I carry a camera on the back of my bike while I’m cycling the idyllic country lanes of the area, and that’s how I find these dead animals.  In the Roadside series, [BAKER 3] dating from 2011-12, within a single photograph each piece in the series juxtaposed roadkill encountered on those bike rides with bits of the bike itself – often a pedal, as here, or the shadow of a spoked wheel, or whatever.  It was, I suppose, a record of my presence on the scene, my implication in the recording and display of a death that would otherwise probably have gone unnoticed.  But you can see what’s happening here.  I had created a little narrative, which I’m spelling out to you, but which is already contained within the photographs themselves.  [BAKER 4]  It’s guiding the viewer, inviting them to read the image in a particular way, and it now seems to me that it’s all a bit too self-congratulatory.  I’m the eco-friendly artist-on-a-bike, and I’m almost certainly not responsible for the animal’s death, but I’m acknowledging my implication in the representation of that death.  And I suspect that people are looking at that narrative – which I’ve shaped and controlled, and which I fear may actually sanitize the image – at least as much as they’re looking at the image itself.  And that’s certainly one way in which that particular series might be thought of as still having an unintentionally anthropocentric dimension to it.
[BAKER 5]   So with this new Scapeland series, I’ve decided to say nothing (which is not always easy for an art historian).  Nothing by way of explanation, or contextualization, or apology.  It’s not the artist’s job to make work that is self-consciously ethically sound or ethically engaged – work that tells a consoling story, in other words.  Even for artists with a direct concern for the more-than-human world, there needs to be a degree of ruthlessness in their looking – including their looking at animals – that strips away everything inessential in the manner in which that looking is presented to the viewer.  No lessons, no messages, no symbolism, no “intentions,” no distractions.  Just something that “stands,” as the artist Helen Bullard puts it.
	[BAKER 6]   And something rather difficult and counter-intuitive is going on here too, in that process of ruthless looking.  In the making of the work, there’s a necessary overlooking of the animal – an overlooking of its animalness, of the specialness and difference of its being an animal.  A necessary letting go of anticipated readings by later viewers, a letting go of anything to do with content.  I say this because of my own experience of making these pieces.  At the point where I get off my bike to photograph a dead pheasant, or when I later sit at the computer to juxtapose it with some other bit of the Norfolk landscape, I’m not thinking about the bird’s brutally shortened life.  If anything, it’s the material continuity of feathers, flint, earth, guts, leaves and stone that is being registered.
	[BAKER 7]  There are of course dangers to this necessary overlooking or disattending to the animal.  In one sense it’s very similar to what Catherine Bell was doing with the squid whose deaths she’d specifically commissioned, until that moment in the performance when, as she said, it was suddenly “me and the material, me and the animal, and me and the process of doing that, and being totally caught up in that exchange.”  But what she was describing there, and what I’m trying to describe too, is that opaque process in which the artwork becomes an object, a thing-in-itself, and not a thing “about” something else, a thing with an agenda.
So from the perspective of the artist, at least, the title of this paper – “How do we speak about art about animals?” – is perhaps rather misleading.  Because the work is not “about” animals.  I’m learning this slowly, and with difficulty, for myself – through making these images – so I find it a struggle to articulate it clearly.  In some way or other, the idea of “the animal” needs to be decentred in the work, just as the human does.  I think of the Scapeland series – as its title perhaps suggests – as somehow connecting to a landscape tradition, [BAKER 8] in which, as here, animals are not always visibly present.
I have one further example to discuss, which is also included in the Ecce Animalia exhibition.  As it happens, it also includes encounters with roadkill.  [PAUSE]  “I sometimes bump into things and make mistakes.  I see a flat world.”  [HIGH 1]  These words are spoken by the dead dog Lily – who bumps into things because she has only one remaining eye – in Kathy High’s 2010 Lily Does Derrida, which she subtitles A Dog’s Video Essay.  In both its words and its imagery, it is a tale of flattened animals, lively language, and the collision of different deaths and different degrees of deadness.  Loping around the house and garden, peering at the camera with her one remaining eye, Lily bluntly announces, near the start of the video, “I’m dead.”  (She speaks in the voice of a human male, to dislocate things just a little further.)  She muses on her condition: “I’ve been reading a lot these days, and Jacques Derrida has caught my interest. Too bad he died, but then – I’m dead too, by the way.”  And she amuses herself with his condition: “‘The animal’, he says, ‘which is at unease with itself.’  We are not so uneasy.  What is it about human animals which is so uneasy with us animal types?”
[HIGH 2]  Soon after this, on to the screen comes the first section of the video’s roadkill footage.  A small mammal lies in the road, dead, it seems, its mouth full of maggots, though an arrow briefly appears on screen to point to its still-twitching back leg, as a large fly feasts on its face.  And scrolling across the screen, [HIGH 3] as if to caption the spectacle, come Derrida’s words, simultaneously voiced in dead dog Lily’s male American accent: “Derrida asks, ‘Does the animal dream?’  Another way of asking, ‘Does the animal think?’ ‘Does the animal produce representations?’”  And a string of others: “Does it die?,” “Does it invent?,” and so on.  [HIGH 4]  But far from the words framing how the animal imagery is seen, that blistering image of the roadkill and the insects spills over unstoppably into Derrida’s famous text, as does Lily’s voice, now lurking in its pages for future readers.
By way of a brief conclusion, I’d like to refer to the subtitle of this conference: The Fall of the Anthropocentric Paradigm.   Does the work of the artists I’ve mentioned contribute to destabilizing that paradigm in any way, and shifting either our perceptions or those of the artists themselves?  In several cases, I think that it does.  For example, Kathy High conjures up an animal voice in dialogue with Derrida, wittily threatening to undermine the philosophical authority of his ubiquitous text.  [BRITTON CLOUSE 3]  Mary Britton Clouse’s facial juxtapositions propose an equivalence, a cross-species exchange, in a manner more convincingly complex than the prohibitions of her campaigning words.  [SINGER 3]  Angela Singer’s ethically committed work slowly leads her to the recognition that her viewers need to draw their own conclusions about its significance.  And against the odds, and contrary to her own stated intentions, [BELL 4] even Catherine Bell’s compromised performance enacts a forgetting of the (anthropocentric) self, calling to mind Foucault’s words about images and experiences “within which we both recognize and lose ourselves.”
In each of these cases we see a realization of Félix Guattari’s conception of art as “an activity of unframing,” rupturing the sense of all that is unquestioningly taken for granted in our thinking about animals and our moralizing about animals.  [POSTER]  And each, in their different ways, echoes the title of the exhibition we’ll be seeing later this afternoon: Ecce Animalia!
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